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Abstract
Mobility is one of the most important driving forces of the hyper-interconnected world that
we are living in. Mobile computing devices are becoming smaller, more ubiquitous and si-
multaneously providing more computing power. Various mobile devices in different sizes
with high computing power cause the emergence of new type of networks’ applications.
Researchers in conferences, soldiers in battlefields, medics in rescue missions, and drivers
in busy highways can perform more efficiently if they can be connected to each other and
aware of the environment they are interacting with. In all mentioned scenarios, the major
barrier to have an interconnected collaborative environment is the lack of infrastructure.
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are very promising to be able to handle this challenge.
In recent years, extensive research has been done on MANETs in order to deliver secure
and reliable network services in an infrastructure-less environment. MANETs usually deal
with dynamic network topologies and utilize wireless technologies, they are very suscepti-
ble to different security attacks targeting different network layers. Combining policy-based
management concepts and trust evaluation techniques in more granular level than current
trust management frameworks can lead to interesting results toward more secure and reliable
MANETs.
Keywords. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Policy-Based System Management, Trust Managent
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2011, for the first time, the global unit shipment of smartphones and tablets surpasseddesktop and notebook PCs [36]. Today, mobile smart devices can be seen everywhere and
terms like Internet of Things and service oriented architecture are commonly used. Users
desire access to their information wherever they are and whenever they want. To move
toward this goal, advanced wireless communication standards have been developed, and
different types of connected devices have been introduced.
For many applications, these devices need to be connected to an existing network to
access data and perform their assigned tasks. Today, a fixed and robust network infras-
tructure is in place and millions computers are using different types of protocols to make
connections between themselves in order to provide a framework for developing and deploy-
ing new distributed computing systems. New smart mobile devices have been introduced,
and new operating systems and protocols have been developed. These devices can form wire-
less networks, which are connected to the pre-existing infrastructures. This type of wireless
network is called infrastructure-based wireless network and can be seen as an extension to
the fixed wired network. In infrastructure-based wireless network [20], wireless devices are
all connected to an access point, which acts as a bridge between wired and wireless net-
works. Infrastructure-based wireless networks form wireless LANs, which are used in offices,
airports, and train stations. Deploying this type of network can cut the cost of wiring and
maintenance of the network [20]. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the infrastructure-based wireless
network.
In some scenarios, smart mobile devices do not have access to any fixed network infras-
tructures. In order to accomplish an assigned task the devices should be connected to each
other in an ad hoc manner. In these scenarios, there is no pre-existing network infrastructure
1
Figure 1.1: Infrastructure based wireless network
to rely on. Responsibility for providing network connectivity is shared by all the mobile de-
vices. For example, in military battle fields, there is no pre-existing network infrastructure;
If troops or military equipment need to be connected to each other to conduct a mission,
they need to form an ad hoc network. These types of ad hoc networks are infrastructure-less
wireless networks. An infrastructure-less wireless network is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Ad hoc networks are decentralized types of wireless networks. In this type of network,
nodes should cooperatively form the network and manage all the connectivity issues. In most
cases, it is desirable that the network can operate and accomplish its mission without any
central entity. Trying to have a network managing mechanism without any central entity is
a step toward having a truly distributed system.
In the majority of ad hoc networks’ applications, nodes are not stationary. Nodes
change their positions in the network. While they are moving, they need to stay connected
to the network. This type of mobile ad hoc networks are categorized as MANET [20]. Lack
of centralized management entity, mobility, and wireless communication makes MANET
susceptible to a variety of security attacks. With advances in wireless communication and
proliferation of mobile devices, researchers try to investigate the different security solutions
for MANETs in order to make them capable of delivering reliable services.
2
Figure 1.2: Infrastructure less wireless network
1.1 MANET characteristics and applications
Mobile ad hoc networks are a collection of mobile devices, equipped with wireless technologies
that form a network without any central administrative entity [20]. In this type of network,
nodes can communicate with each other directly or through other nodes without using any
central entity to manage the connections. In a MANET, nodes acts as hosts and routers.
Node mobility causes frequent network topology changes and routing protocols should be
capable of maintaining connectivity in such a dynamic environment. Some of the most
important characteristics of MANET are as follows [20]:
• As a result of wireless communication links, MANETs have lower bandwidth capacity
in comparison to wired networks; they are subject to jamming, signal fading and
interference [49];
• In MANETs, nodes usually depend on battery power. Thus nodes should perform
their tasks in the most energy efficient manner;
• Because of wireless links and absence of central entities, security in MANETs can
easily be compromised. Wireless nodes are vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming.
Therefore, detecting malicious from benevolent nodes is not easy;
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• Mobility of nodes lead to frequent topology changes. Routing protocols in MANETs
should be agile in responding in order to frequent changes to maintain a current route
between nodes [2];
• Because of lacking a fixed-infrastructure, MANETs are easy and fast to deploy. There-
fore, they can provide an instant network formation, and reduce the cost of deployment
and maintenance of the network;
These characteristics make MANET an ideal option for the following applications
• MANET can be used in military battlefields, where there is no fixed infrastructure and
nodes (troops or military equipments) need to be connected to each other;
• MANET can be used in rescue operations, where network infrastructures are damaged
due to natural catastrophes;
• MANET can be used in classrooms, conferences, and meetings in order to allow par-
ticipants to share their information without the need of connecting to a central server;
• MANET can be used to form personal area networks [47], where a person wants to
form a network between his/her PDA, laptop, and a printer without having to plug
anything in;
1.2 Security challenges in MANET
Securing MANETs, because of salient characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks such as
vulnerability of channel, vulnerability of nodes, absence of infrastructure, and dynamically
changing topology is a challenging task [19]. Moreover, every application has its own security
requirements. A robust and reliable security solution should provide security services such
as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, and availability. Here we briefly
describe these services
Availability means that a node should provide all promised services regardless of security
state of it [30]. Sometimes nodes in a MANET become malicious or selfish and hesitate to
collaborate with other nodes to deliver the designed service of the network. This is the main
root of denial of service [49] attacks.
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Integrity of messages should be kept during transmission. Either malicious activities or
transmission disturbance can corrupt a message. Integrity guarantees that a transmitted
message is not corrupted [19].
Confidentiality means that information can be accessed by those who have been au-
thorized to access it [30]. It guarantees that sensitive information like military, routing or
personal information is never disclosed to unauthorized entities [19].
Authenticity ensures that claims of identity from participants in a communication are
authentic [30]. If there is no such a service in place, a malicious node can impersonate a
benign node and start a communication with another node.
Non-repudiation ensures that a sender or receiver of a message can not deny that they
have ever sent or received such a message [30].
Authorization is the process of issuing credentials which specify the privileges and per-
missions of accessing a resource. Authorization is used to assign different access rights to
users from different user levels [49].
Anonymity means that a node should privately keep all the information that can be used
to identify the owner or the current user of the node and should not distribute this informa-
tion in the network [30].
Several attacks have been designed to violate these security services [49]. Attacks target
different network protocols and attempt to disrupt the proper functionality of the network.
In order to design a security solution for MANETs, as noted by V. Balakrishnan et al. [6],
maybe the fundamental question to be addressed is “how to enable a mobile node to enlist
trusted intermediate mobile nodes so that they can cooperate in forwarding the information
to a target without modifying the information or obstructing the operation of other mobile
nodes.” This shows that security of MANETs heavily depends on security of communication
layer.
In order to deliver security services in MANETs, several secure routing protocols like
SAODV [32] have been suggested. However because of the absence of centralized authority,
key management which is the key function of secure routing could not be done properly. Also,
because of repeated topology changes secure routing protocols are incapable of distinguishing
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genuinely broken links from maliciously reported ones [6]. Hence, incentive-based systems
have been proposed. Incentive-based systems such as SIP try to stimulate cooperation in
packet forwarding among nodes by introducing concepts like credit [50]. Incentive-based
systems to some extent could motivate selfish nodes, which do not collaborate with other
nodes in order to save their battery power, CPU cycle, or available bandwidth, to cooperate
in forwarding the network traffic with other nodes. In contrast, malicious nodes which
deliberately want to disturb the functionality of the network can still ignore all the incentives
and harm the network. Shortcomings of secure routing and incentive-based protocols led
to emergence of trust-based management systems [6] . Trust-based management solutions
introduced the concept of trust among nodes in MANETs. These systems usually consist
of three main modules: monitor, reputation manager, and trust manager. By utilizing
these modules, they can proactively detect and reactively isolate malicious or selfish nodes
[6]. Several trust-management systems have been introduced [13][18] but few of these use
their acquired information from network monitoring and knowledge of an attack’s behaviour
toward defining policies for detection of a specific type of attack. Doing that, more effective
policies will be defined and attacks will be detected with higher rates.
1.3 Thesis focus
The thesis focus is to introduce a new trust management system that can be deployed on
nodes in mobile ad hoc networks and make them resistant to security attacks. The computa-
tion power and network bandwidth of nodes are limited in MANET, thus we plan to develop
a computationally light-weighted mechanism to turn each node into a autonomous abnor-
mality detector. We will show how our framework utilizes policies and a simple collaboration
scheme among neighbours to prevent potential abnormalities.
1.4 Thesis organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers background and related
work, including key definitions, concepts and a review of the current research relevant to
security issues in Mobile ad hoc networks, policy-based management systems, and trust
management in MANET. Chapter 3 describes the architecture of our proposed policy based
trust management system to be deployed in each node in Manet. Chapter 4 describes the
implemented prototype of our proposed framework. Chapter 5, Experiment, defines a case
6
study and shows how the framework can handle abnormality detection in Manet. Finally,
Chapter 6, Conclusion, provides some final conclusions and presents ideas and thoughts for
future research in the area.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
This chapter presents key definitions and concepts, and reviews the current research which
is relevant to MANETs’ security vulnerabilities and attacks. Section 2.1 presents security
issues in MANET and discusses possible security attacks in different network layers. Section
2.2 presents different types of routing which are being used as the bases of mobile routing
algorithms. Section 2.3 describes common routing protocols in MANET. Section 2.4 explains
the notion of policy in managing a MANET. Finally, in section 2.5, a wormhole attack and
its countermeasures are studied.
2.1 Security in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Attacks in mobile ad hoc networks can be classified from different perspectives. Each attack
can be classified as Internal or External and Passive or Active [19].
2.1.1 Internal vs. External attacks
External attacks are carried out by outsiders. These types of attacks are launched by nodes
that do not belong to the domain of the network. On the other hand, internal attacks are
performed by compromised insiders that are network members and have some privileged
access rights that make them more disruptive and hard-to-detect.
2.1.2 Passive vs. Active attacks
Passive attacks obtain information from communications in the networks without disrupting
the normal behaviour of the network. Eavesdropping, traffic analysis, and traffic monitoring
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[49] are examples of passive attacks. On the other hand, active attacks not only obtain
information from the network, they also modify, fabricate, drop, or replay packets in the
network. Thus, they interrupt the normal behaviour of the networks. Jamming, spoofing,
modification, replaying are examples of active attacks [49].
Wu, Bing, et. all in [49] further categorized MANET attacks based on different lay-
ers, stealthy versus non-stealthy attacks, and cryptography versus non-cryptography related
attacks.
2.1.3 Security attacks in mobile ad hoc networks
2.1.3.1 Physical layer attacks
The broadcast wireless nature of MANETs’ communications means that signal jamming and
eavesdropping can be easily done by an adversary.
• Eavesdropping: Wireless links are broadcast in nature. Some mobile hosts share a
wireless medium in ad hoc networks. Thus, wireless signals, which are usually in
radio frequency spectrum, can be intercepted and heard by unauthorized third parties.
Eavesdropping is the capturing of a message by an unauthorized receiver who is looking
for confidential information such as location, public key, private key, or passwords [30].
• Interference and jamming: Radio signals can be jammed and interfered with some
stronger signals emitted from outsider or compromised insider nodes. These strong
signals can corrupt the messages and prevent messages from being delivered to their
destination. The attacker can transmit random noises and pulses into the network
which can in turn overwhelm the network signals.
2.1.3.2 Link layer attacks
Link layer protocols are responsible for ensuring the connectivity between 1-hop neighbours.
Wireless medium access control (MAC) protocol has to coordinate the transmission of nodes
on transmission medium. Since token-passing bus, which is used in wired network can not
be used in wireless environment, IEEE 802.11 protocols are dedicated to dealing with con-
trolling the wireless medium [49]. The 802.11 MAC working group suggested two contention
resolution mechanisms: distributed coordination function and point coordination function
[7]. Only the decentralized scheme in applicable to MANETs [11]. DCF is a random access
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scheme which is based on carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
protocol. DCF uses handshake scheme called RTS-CTS along with binary exponential back
off rules to avoid possible collisions in wireless environments [7]. An attacker can deviate
from CSMA/CA rules in a way it can disrupt the network operations toward its own benefits.
2.1.3.3 Network layer attacks
Network layer protocols are responsible for extending the one-hop neighbouring connectivity
to all other nodes in the network. There are a large number of attacks targeting this layer in
the network. An attacker tries to inject itself to the network in order to disrupt the routing
process in different phases of routing such as route discovery, route maintenance, or data
forwarding [25]. Network layer attacks take the control of the network traffic flow and cause
severe damage such as preventing a node from finding the optimum path to the destination,
partitioning the network, forwarding packets to a nonexistent path, and creating routing
loops. Sometimes two or more colluding nodes collaborate to perform sophisticated attacks
in order to take control of the network traffic flow. Some of the network layer attacks are as
follows [49].
• Routing table overflow attack: In this attack, attacker advertises routes to non-existent
nodes and causes other nodes to become incapable of finding new routes while having
their routing tables overwhelmed by false routes. This attack targets proactive routing
protocols because proactive routing protocols rely on periodic route advertisements. In
order to attack on-demand routing protocols two or more colluding nodes are needed
in a way that one node request a route to nonexistence destination and the other node
replies with a false route [16].
• Routing cache poisoning attack: In ad hoc networks, sometimes when a node senses a
packet, it updates its routing table using information contained in that packet. This
operation is called promiscuous routing table updating. A malicious node can broad-
cast a packet with false routing information and cause some nodes to update their
routing table information with this incorrect information. Doing this, the malicious
node can direct the network traffic to pass through it [49].
• Replay attack: Due to node mobility, network topology frequently changes. In this
attack, a node records routing control messages of another node and replay them later.
Doing this, the node deceives other nodes about routing information that may be stale
[25].
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• Wormhole attack: A wormhole attack is a severe network layer attack which can disrupt
a high percentage of communication across the network. It is easy to implement and
challenging to detect. In this attack, a malicious node records packets in one location
of a network and tunnels them to another malicious node at a distant point in the
network. The second malicious node replays the received packets. Wormhole attacks
are discussed in detail in 2.5.
2.1.3.4 Transport layer attacks
The transport layer in MANET is responsible for reliable delivery of packets, congestion
control, flow control, and clearing of connections [49] between communicating entities. TCP-
like protocols in MANET should handle higher channel error rate in comparison to TCP in
weired networks. Like the TCP protocol in fixed networks, MANET protocols are vulnerable
to SYN flooding and session hijacking attacks.
• Session hijacking: In this attack, attacker spoofs the victim’s IP address and finds the
expected sequence number in a TCP session between the victim and a third entity
with an active session with the victim. Using this information, an attacker can hijack
the established session and gain the control over the session. Usually by launching a
DoS against the victim, the attacker keeps victim busy and uses the hijacked session to
communicate with the third entity. The fact that most communications are protected
only at session setup not thereafter is used by attacker to launch this attack.
• SYN flooding: In order to establish a TCP connection, two communicating nodes have
to do a three-way hand shake [28]. During the hand shake process three messages of
type SYN and SYN-ACK are exchanged. Upon completion of the hand shake process,
a fully-opened TCP connection is created.
An attacker sends a large number of SYN packets with spoofed return addresses to a
victim. The victim replies to SYN packets with ACK packets and waits for the response
of ACK from the attacker to complete the three-way hand shake. The attacker does
not send a final ACK to the victim which leads to many half-open connections and
waste of resources of the victim [24].
2.1.3.5 Application layer attacks
The application layer is where all user data, which are an attacker’s highest interest, reside.
The application layer is the home of protocols such as HTTP, FTP, SMPT which potentially
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can provide many vulnerabilities that attackers could have a stake in.
• Malicious code attacks: Malicious code can appear in the form of viruses, worms, and
Trojan horses and disrupt the proper functionality of the network. Viruses are self-
replicating code segments that are attached to other host executables. As soon as the
host is executed the virus code is activated. Viruses usually replicate themselves and
attach to different executables. Worms are also self-replicating programs but they do
not need any other executable to play role of a host for them. They can run and
replicate themselves without any other intervention. Worms usually exploit network
services to propagate themselves through the network [38]. Trojan horses are malicious
codes masquerading as a legitimate application. Trojan horses do not replicate and
they try to deceive their victims that they are providing benign services and then start
to capture information.
• Repudiation attacks: Repudiation is the denial of participation in a communication. A
secure system has to provide non-repudiation as one of its security services. It means
the system should ensure that entities could not deny what they have done in the
different states of the system. Repudiation attacks take advantage of lack of a proper
logging system and launch repudiation attacks.
2.2 Routing
Routing is the process of selecting a path through which network traffic can be forwarded
from one host to another. Routing is the responsibility of the network layer in the net-
work protocol stack. When a node joins a network, it is completely unaware of the network
topology. Therefore, it starts a process, called neighborhood discovery, in which the node
constructs its routing table and starts to learn about the network topology. After the dis-
covery phase a node starts another process called routing table update in order to maintain
its connectivity to the network. In this phase, nodes have their knowledge of topology up-
dated by exchanging their routing tables. There are two broad classes of routing algorithms:
decentralized and global [28]. In a decentralized routing algorithm, routing nodes do not
have the knowledge of all the links in the network. Each node, through collaboration with
its neighbors will eventually have a routing table which is complete and up-to-date. On
the other hand, in global routing algorithms, each node has the complete overview of the
network’s links and it broadcasts all its routing table changes not only to its neighbors, but
also to all other nodes.
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2.2.1 Distance Vector routing protocols
Distance-vector protocols are decentralized. In these protocols, nodes are not aware of the
whole path to destination, and nodes only maintain a vector (table) of destinations and
minimum distance to destination nodes in their routing tables. In this approach, nodes
periodically, upon expiration of a counter or updates in routing table, send their routing
tables to their neighbors. By receiving routing tables from its neighbours, a node can recal-
culate its routing table and forward the new routing table to its neighbors and so on. Since
nodes usually deal only with the routing tables received from their neighbors, the topology
control traffic does not use a large chunk of network bandwidth. Also, nodes do not need
to consume high processing power and memory in order to have an updated routing table.
These type of routing protocols use Bellman-Ford [45] algorithm to calculate paths between
communicating nodes, and they are not loop-free. These routing algorithms are susceptible
to count-to-infinity problem [31] and suffer from scalability issues. Distance vector routing
protocols, in comparison to link-state routing protocols, have less computational complexity
and message overhead. RIPv1, RIPv2, and IGRP are examples of distance vector routing
protocols [28].
2.2.2 Link-State routing protocols
Link-state routing protocols are global. In link-state routing protocols, routing algorithms
need to have a complete knowledge of the network topology. These types of routing al-
gorithms take a complete and global knowledge of connectivity between all nodes in order
to compute the least-cost path between source and destination. To do so, nodes need to
broadcast the identities and costs of their links to all other nodes. Besides routing table,
each node has a topological database to store all the links’ information in the network. This
information is broadcasted using a specific message called link-state advertisement [3]. This
data propagation through the network is called flooding. Initially, a node does not know
about all other nodes in the network, but after a while, by receiving other nodes’ broadcasts,
it eventually learns the topology of the network, and starts the path calculation process. In
link-state algorithms, usually Dijkstra’s algorithm is used in path-calculation process and
count-to-infinity problem does not arise. In comparison with distance-vector algorithms,
link-state routing algorithms need more computational power and storage. OSPF, IS-IS are
examples of link-state routing protocols [28].
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2.3 Routing in mobile ad hoc networks
In ad hoc networks, nodes perform as hosts and routers. Initially, a node does not have
any knowledge about other nodes in the network. Nodes need to disseminate information
about their existence, and listen to the network in order to find the current topology. Based
on the nature of the ad hoc networks, ad hoc routing protocols should deal with an ad
hoc network’s limitations, such as limited bandwidth, high power consumption, and high
error rate. In order to better understand routing protocols for MANETs, the reason we
cannot use conventional routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks should be investigated.
The following is a summarized list of MANET characteristics which shows why designing a
routing protocol for MANET is a challenging task.
• In MANET rate of topology changes is very high, and it causes difficulty in convergence
of conventional routing algorithms into steady state [41];
• Wireless links are less reliable that wired ones, and their performance will fluctuate
based on environmental conditions;
• Wireless links can be unidirectional which prevents the proper handshake between
sender and receiver;
• Wireless links, lack of centralized entity, dynamic topology changes, and delay in prop-
agation of new routing information makes the design of stable routing protocol for
MANETs challenging;
• Wireless devices usually rely on batteries as their source of power. Sometimes a lack of
power can force a node to act selfishly and prevent its participation with other nodes
to form updated routes.
Thus, routing protocols in ad hoc networks should be capable of dealing with all these
characteristics of MANETs and provide a service that can ensure scalability and security.
This is why classic routing protocols are inadequate for MANETs. An ideal routing protocol
for wireless ad hoc network should have the following characteristics:
• cope with frequent topology changes
• deal with possible unidirectional links
• be simple
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• scale well in different network parameters such as network size, mobility, and traffic
• perform in a distributed manner
• handle multiple routes for a specific destination in order to reduce the topology control
messages
• be loop free
• prevent network partitioning
2.3.1 MANET routing protocols from different perspectives
MANET routing protocols can be classified based on the way they envision the network,
which conventional routing approach they use, and how they act upon topology changes.
2.3.1.1 Flat, Hierarchical, and Geographical routing protocols
Flat routing protocols consider every node to be equal. In this type of routing, when a node
wants to find a route to another node, it considers all other nodes equal and it assumes
no preferences between nodes. There is no effort to organize nodes or traffic in different
categories and the network is assumed, by routing protocol, to be seated on a flat geometric
plane. Hierarchical routing protocols give different roles to nodes. Some nodes are assigned
special duties such as being a gateway. The notion of clustering comes to play. When a
node wants to forward a packet to a destination and the the destination node is not in
its neighborhood, it sends the packet to a special node called gateway. The gateway then
sends the packet to other gateways until it reaches the gateway with a direct connection to
the destination. In geographical routing, routing is based on the geographical positions of
nodes. This means that a source node uses geographical address of the destination node to
forward a packet instead of using its network address. Each node should be aware of its
own geographical location and the destination’s geographical location. Thus, in this type
of protocol, routing can be done without the knowledge of the network topology and route
discovery process.
2.3.1.2 Link-state, Distance-Vector routing protocols
In MANETs, there are families of routing protocols which inherit the characteristics of con-
ventional routing protocols. These types of protocols utilize conventional routing concepts,
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consider all the characteristics and limitations of MANETs and propose some novel tech-
niques to deliver reliable services.
2.3.1.3 Proactive, Reactive, and Hybrid routing protocols
In proactive routing protocols, each node (router) proactively maintains a fresh list of routes
to all other nodes in the network. These routes will be used by each node whenever they
are needed. Because routes already have been found and reside in the routing table, no
latency is imposed on the network prior to forwarding a packet to find the needed route.
Routes are computed periodically through the dissemination of control messages throughout
the network, which impose heavy traffic to the network. Examples of this kind of protocol
are OLSR, DSDV, and TBRPF [41]. On the other hand, in reactive routing approach, the
routing protocol does not take the initiative for finding a route to the destination until it is
required, and there is no topology table in nodes. This type of protocol, which are also called
on-demand, do not flood the network with periodically disseminated control traffic in order
to maintain fresh route to all other nodes. On-demand protocols start the route discovery
process whenever it is needed, and the route is maintained through the route maintenance
procedure until the route is no longer required. Therefore, they experience the route discovery
delay prior to forwarding a message to a new destination. When node S wants to transmit
data to node D, and it has no valid route to D, it starts a route discovery process. In route
discovery S starts broadcasting to all nodes searching for node D. The process is completed
when the route is found or all possible route permutations have been examined. After the
route has been found, the route maintenance procedure maintains the route until either the
destination become inaccessible, or the route is no longer needed. The main advantage of
this type of protocol is that the wireless channel does not need to carry a large amount of
routing overhead for routes that are no longer used. AODV, DSR, and TORA are reactive
routing protocols [41]. Hybrid routing protocols try to combine the advantages of reactive
and proactive routing protocols. For example, the Zone routing protocol defines a zone
around each node. Inside the zone, routing is done in a proactive manner and outside the
zone routing is done reactively. Doing this, nodes inside the defined zone are immediately
available, and to access further nodes the protocol will use reactive approach in an optimized
way. It should be mentioned that hybrid routing inevitably combines the disadvantages of
reactive and proactive protocols.
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2.3.2 MANET routing protocols descriptions
This section describes two commonly used MANET routing protocols.
2.3.2.1 AODV Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
AODV is a reactive (On-Demand) distance vector routing protocol which can be used in large
wireless ad-hoc networks [37]. AODV is a distance vector routing protocol and it inherits
the concept of destination sequence number from DSDV to become loop-free. In on-demand
routing protocols there is no need for periodic broadcasts of route advertisements, however
on-demand acquiring of a route introduces the route acquisition latency to the network.
In AODV, which uses symmetric links between neighboring nodes [37], nodes that are not
involved in any data communication process, neither maintain any routing information nor
exchange routing tables with their neighbors. In AODV, routing process is done in four
phases: path discovery, route table management, path maintenance, and local connectivity
management. When a node wants to communicate with another node and it does not have
any route information to destination, it starts the route discovery process. In this phase
the source node sends the special packet called Route Request (RREQ) to all its neighbors.
If a neighbor can provide the route, it sends back a Route Reply (RREP) message to the
source node. Otherwise, it forwards the RREQ to its neighbors. The RREQ is propagated
through the network until it reaches the destination node. All intermediate nodes on the
path from source to destination maintain some information in order to build forwarding and
reversing path from the source to the destination node. Thus, in path discovery process,
with help of intermediary nodes, the forwarding and reversing paths between source and
destination node are setup. In route management phase, each node has some information
associated with each route table entry, such as destination sequence number of that entry,
request expiration time, active route timeout, and route caching timeout. Also, each entry in
the routing table contains destination address, next hop, number of hops, sequence number
for destination, active neighbor for this route, and expiration time for this entry. Using this
information, each node maintains up-to-date active routes to different destinations. Broken
links can be detected using periodic hello messages, link-layer acknowledgments, or detecting
failing attempts to forward a packet to the next hop. If a link breaks, the node notifies all
other nodes that were using that link by sending a special RREP message with hop count
of ∞ and sequence number that is one greater than previously known sequence number.
Upon receiving a broken link notification, if the link is still needed, the node starts the route
discovery process with a destination sequence number of one greater than the previously
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known sequence number. These are all being done in the path maintenance phase. In local
connectivity management phase, if a node does not send any packets to its active neighbors
during a time named hello interval, it broadcasts a special RREP called hello messages.
A hello message contains the time to live of one and a list of all nodes that the sending
node heard their hello messages; therefore, a receiving node does not rebroadcast it and can
be sure of existence of bidirectional link between sender and itself. These phases are not
necessarily sequential, as each node tries to create new route if it is needed and it tries to
maintain its active route while it maintains its local connectivity to its neighbors.
2.3.2.2 OLSR - Optimized Link State Routing
OLSR is a proactive routing protocol [15] where each node proactively maintains a list of
routes to all other nodes in the network. These routes are used by each node whenever
needed. There is no latency prior to forwarding the message since the routes have already
been found and reside in the routing table. OLSR is an optimized version of conventional
link state routing for mobile ad hoc networks. OLSR enhances the inherited characteristics
of link state routing by reducing the size and number of broadcast control messages in the
network. OLSR does this by introducing the Multi-point Relays (MPRs). Each node selects
a subset of its neighbors as multi-point relays. Multi-point relays are selected based on the
fact that all the two-hop neighbors are accessible through them. Each node in the network
maintains a list of nodes, which have been selected as a multi-point relay in a table called
MPR selectors. Each node periodically broadcasts its MPR selector table and all the avail-
able routes to other nodes. Therefore, in OLSR, the route is a sequence of hops through the
multi-point relays from source to destination. OLSR functions in four phases. Each node
periodically disseminates hello messages which contain the list of all one hop neighbors and
their connection status, that can be directional, bidirectional, or MPR. These hello messages
will be received by all one-hop neighbors, and these neighbors will not broadcast hello mes-
sages any further. By receiving a hello message, a node determines if it has been selected
by its neighbors as MPR. Each node maintains a list of MPR selectors, and periodically
broadcast this table using a special type of message called topology control message (TC).
TC messages will be broadcasted throughout the networks, and all the nodes in the net-
work will build their routing tables based on their one-hop neighbors table, MPR selector
table, and TC messages they have received. OLSR uses the concept of sequence number,
which identifies the most recent information, to get rid of controlling in-order delivery of
control messages. OLSR particularly is a good option for dense and large networks. OLSR
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is designed to work in a completely distributed manner and there is no dependency on any
central entity.
2.4 Policy-based management
Nowadays, systems in general are becoming more complex and decentralized. Social, fi-
nancial, political, and information systems are getting larger and comprise a great number
of entities. Managing this type of system is time consuming and tedious. Managers have
to spend a lot of time trying to govern different entities, monitor their behaviours, detect
abnormalities, and make important decisions to act upon them. Large systems need a huge
amount of expensive administrative tasks which are critical to maintain the system in a
healthy state. A large body of research has been dedicated to system management and
finding ways to automating administrative tasks.
In complex distributed computer networks, different types of entities are involved and
collaborate to deliver the main service of the networks. In these types of networks human,
computers, and peripherals are all bounded to each other to deliver resources to the net-
works’ users. Due to this entity diversity and different requested services from users, network
management is a complex and arduous task. Network management tasks include fault man-
agement, performance management, and security management [3]. In order to automate
these facets of networks management, researchers have proposed different solutions. One of
these solutions is policy-based network management (PBNM).
In PBNM systems, administrators do not deal with the detailed configuration of en-
tities in the network. Instead they define high-level requirements of the expected network
behaviour. PBNM systems then configure all the settings in a way to be compliant to the
requirements of the system. High-level requirements are injected to the PBNM in the form of
a policy. Policies are building blocks of PBNM systems. Policy is information which can di-
rect or modify the behaviour of a system [34]. D. Agrawal et al. define policy as externalized
logic which can drive the behaviour of a system [1]. In order to have a secure manageable
system Matt Bishop in Computer Security Art and Science [8] considers a computer system
as a finite-state automaton with a set of transition functions that change states. He defined
policy as a statement that divides states into secure and nonsecure groups. A secure system
is a system which can neither start, nor enter in a nonsecure state.
Policies define either long-term requirements of a network, such as supported traffic
and specific level of QoS, or how a network should respond to events such as detection of a
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malicious user. PBNM systems have a automated feed back loop which is used to make a
network responsive to changes without requiring any human action. The general concept of
policy-based management systems is depicted in 2.1.
Policy management
Figure 2.1: Policy-based Network Management
2.4.1 Policy-based network management architecture
In order to standardize the PBNM system concepts several working groups such as IETF [23]
and DMTF [17] tried to propose an architecture for a PBNM system. A PBNM system as
illustrated in 2.2 consists of policy management tool, policy repository, policy decision point,
and policy enforcement point.
The policy management tool is used by administrators for defining and modifying
policies that the system should implement in the network in order to keep the network’s
performance compliant to the requirements.
The policy repository is used to as a storage for the defined policy which can be accessed
by other modules of the system.
The policy decision point (PDP) is responsible for interpreting the defined policies
and instructing the network to take the proper action in different states of the system. The
PDP ensures that the system is compliant to the policies all the time. The PDP receives
inputs from the systems regarding the current state, and based on the defined policies directs
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Figure 2.2: Policy-based Network Management Architecture
the system by either instructing an entity to take a specific action, or changing the system’s
configuration.
The policy enforcement point (PEP) is responsible for implementing and enforcing
the PDP’s decisions across the network.
There are two main challenges in designing and implementing policy-based management
systems. The first one is how to translate the high-level policies, which are stemmed from
requirements into a form which is interpretable with system components, and the second is
how to extend the PBNM system to operate in a fully distribute environment.
To address the first challenge, different policy languages have been defined such as Pon-
der, Ismene, Rei, and Policy Description Language (PDL) [3]. Each of these languages take
a different approaches to define policies. Some of these languages use structured programs
developed specifically for expressing policies, some use formal logic languages, and others
use set of simple structured rules in form of if ... then ... else [3].
To address the second challenge, Moris Sloman introduced networked resources as
managed entities and placed them in domains [42]. The main promise of a domain was to
group managed entities (objects) in order to apply management decision to them. Domains
can include other domains and build a hierarchy. They then defined policies as objects which
express a relationship among subject and target objects [42]. Having domain defined in the
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managed environment, two approaches can be used to govern the policies in distributed
fashion: peer-to-peer, hierarchical. In the former, each domain has its own fully independent
network management system, and the coordination between network management system
only happens if both participating parties benefit form this collaboration. In the latter, each
domain has its own network management system but it is not independent of other network
management systems, and they form a hierarchy which governs all the network entities [3].
Policy management has been extensively used in different aspect of network manage-
ment, especially in security management areas such as Role-based access control and Trust
management.
Notion of trust has been used in different areas such as sociology, economics, philos-
ophy, and psychology. In computer science, concept of trust is used in different fields like
autonomic computing and communication and networking. In communication and network-
ing, Aivaloglou et al. defines trust as the quantified belief of a trustor regarding honesty,
competence, security, and dependability of a trustee in a specific context. Also, trust can be
define as the degree of a belief about the behaviour of other entities [13].
2.5 Wormhole attack
We are going to use the proposed framework of the thesis in a case study to detect wormhole
attack in a AODV -powered MANET. In this section the wormhole attack is studied in more
details.
2.5.1 How wormhole attack works
In this attack, attackers capture packets at one location in the network and forwards (tunnels)
them to a distant location to be replayed in order to prevent benign nodes from having a
valid image of the network’s topology. The main goal of wormhole attack is to deceive benign
nodes in a way that attackers can absorb high volume of network traffic to be passed through
them. This attack can be done by one, two or more colluding nodes. Wormhole attacks can
be launched using different techniques [4]. Sadeghi et al [39] has claimed that AODV is
more vulnerable to a wormhole attack than OLSR. Sadeghi et al. [39] presents an analysis of
the performance of AODV and OLSR powered MANET with and without wormhole attack.
They have done their simulation in 1000m * 1000m area with 80 random waypoint mobile
nodes. As AODV and OLSR are two dominant routing protocols MANET, there are lots
of research in order to immunize AODV and OLSR powered MANETs against wormhole
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attacks [4].
2.5.2 Wormhole attack launching techniques
Azer et al. [4] categorized the launching techniques of wormhole attack into five groups.
2.5.2.1 Out-of-Band Channel technique
In this technique, attacker nodes are directly connected, either by using long range directional
wireless links or by direct wired link. As this technique needs special hardware, it is more
expensive to launch and maintain. In this technique a colluding node tunnels received
packets to the other colluding node residing in a distant part of the network using a direct
link. Therefore, the packets will reach that part of the network faster and with fewer numbers
of hops in comparison to packets which took the benign paths. Therefore, nodes residing
close to wormhole ends choose the wormhole path to communicate with other nodes.
2.5.2.2 High Power Transmission technique
In this technique, any node can launch a wormhole attack. The malicious node uses high
power transmission to broadcast received RREQs. Thus, its forwarded RREQs can reach
other nodes faster compared to RREQs which are forwarded by benign nodes. This process
increases the chance of malicious node to be on the routes established between a source and
a destination.
2.5.2.3 Encapsulation technique
In this technique, when a colluding node hears a RREQ, it encapsulates it in a packet and
sends this packet to another colluding node. The receiving colluding node will extract the
encapsulated packet and replay it. In this way, all the nodes resided on the path between
colluding nodes will be ignored in hop-count calculation process. Thus, the destination node
will see the packet with very small hop count that will affect its path selection process. In
this technique there is no need for any special equipment, such as high speed wire link or a
high power source to create the wormhole. One way to prevent this type of wormhole attack
is in the use of a routing protocol, which does not rely on the shortest path (minimum
number of hops) like protocols which select fastest path. Motivation for this type of routing
protocols is that a less congested longer route is better that congested shorter route [27].
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2.5.2.4 Packet relay technique
In this technique, one or two malicious nodes can just play a role of an invisible bridge
between two not-in-range benign nodes. The attacker just relays packets among two nodes,
which are not in communication range of each other, without doing the mandated changes to
the packet header and it deceives these two nodes that they are neighbours. After exchanging
enough hello messages the wormhole will be established and the malicious node can take the
control of the traffic among attacked nodes.
2.5.2.5 Using Protocol Deviations
Sometimes malicious nodes use protocol specification in order to disrupt the normal be-
haviour of the network. For example, a malicious node can ignore the back-off time enforced
by MAC layer in order to win the competition of being the first to reach the destination.
2.5.3 Wormhole attack classification
Khabazizan et al. mention two modes of operation for wormhole attacks: hidden and par-
ticipation mode [43]. In hidden mode colluding nodes do not use their identities to forward
packets. Thus, they remain hidden to legitimate nodes. Basically in this mode, attacking
nodes provide a virtual tunnel between two far-off legitimate nodes. Azer et al. named this
type of wormhole as closed wormhole attack [4]. Well known wormhole detection schemes,
such as packet leashes, directed antenna and SECTOR, deal with wormhole attack in this
mode of operation. In participation mode, colluding nodes do not create a virtual link and
they actively participate in routing as legitimate nodes and by sending packets through the
wormhole they attract more traffic. Azer et al. divided these types of wormholes into open
and half-open wormhole that respectively got their names based on the fact that both or
only one of the colluding nodes reveal their identity to the routing protocol. After launching
the wormhole and absorbing traffic, colluding nodes can launch DoS attacks by randomly
dropping packets.
2.5.4 Wormhole Attack Impacts
We can see wormhole attack as a two-phase process. First, attacker should establish the
wormhole tunnel and absorb network traffic. At this time - end of phase one - we can see
the wormhole as a fast packet delivery service to network which cause the other nodes to not
have a valid image of the network topology. In the second phase, wormhole has been already
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used by other nodes to forward a significant amount of network traffic and attacker can
monitor, edit, or selectively drop packets. Having control of the network traffic, the attacker
has the opportunity to launch other type of attacks, like DoS. Periodically an attacker can
switch an active wormhole off and impose a huge route rediscovery burden to the network. If
a attacker decides to drop the network traffic, nodes close to a wormhole tunnel ends become
sinkholes.
2.5.5 Wormhole attack countermeasures
There are two different approaches to deal with wormhole attacks: proactive (preventive)
and reactive (detective). In proactive countermeasures usually special hardware is added to
nodes. On the other hand, reactive approaches try to investigate some evidence that can
prove existence of a wormhole attack. These two approaches define two lines of defence. In
the literature, there are different categories of defence against wormhole attacks.
2.5.5.1 Location and time based solutions
In these solutions, nodes’ locations and the time they send and receive packets are used
in order to avoid using a wormhole to route packets. In these solutions, nodes are usually
equipped by extra equipment, such as GPS, or they have tightly synchronized clocks.
Packet leashes: Hu et al. introduced the notion of leash where extra information is added
to a packet in order to defend against wormhole attacks [22]. A leash is any information
added to a packet in order to limit the distance a packet can be transmitted. Two types
of leashes have been introduced: geographical and temporal. A geographical leash ensures
that the distance between sender and receiver of a packet does not exceed a certain limit. A
temporal leash ensures that a packet has an upper lifetime limit, and it can not be alive for
more than a specific limit. In geographical leashes, nodes use loosely synchronized clocks in
order to calculate the traveled distance of packet, and in temporal leashes, nodes use tightly
synchronized clocks in order to calculate a precise life time for each packet and prevent a
wormhole attack. Common authentication scheme or signature scheme like MAC and RSA
can be used to ensure the authenticity of timestaps and location information in leashes. The
main drawback of this method is the dependence on clock synchronization and need for extra
equipment such as GPS devices.
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Directional Antenna: Hu et al. [21] introduced directional neighbor discovery, verified
neighbour discovery, and strict neighbor discovery protocols which use directional antenna
to detect the existence of a wormhole attack in MANET. In these protocols directional
information are shared between source and destination. Nodes use specific sectors of their
antennas to communicate with each other. Therefore, a node receiving a message from its
neighbour can calculate the orientation of the neighbour with respect to itself. This extra
bit of information, makes wormhole discovery much easier than in networks with exclusively
omni-directional antennas. This approach requires neither clock synchronization nor location
information, and is energy efficient.
SECTOR: In secure tracking of node encounters (SECTOR) introduced by S. Capkun et
al. [10], like packet leashes, the same principal of measuring distance between nodes has
been followed. However, it only measures single hop distance using Mutual Authentication
with Distance-bounding (MAD) protocol and a special hardware which is appended to nodes
in order to make them able to rapidly exchange challenge nodes with each other. Using these
bidirectional fast- challenge bit exchange, nodes estimate distance between themselves and
their neighbours which lead to wormhole attack detection.
2.5.5.2 Recent approaches
Following we discuss some innovative methods to detect and prevent wormhole attack that
they do not need any extra hardware.
Diffusion of innovations: Azer et al. [5] have suggested a preventive detective scheme
based on a social science theory called diffusion of innovations. This mechanism can help
nodes to detect or prevent wormhole attack even before any interaction with malicious nodes.
They claimed that their scheme is totally decentralized and does not impose any computa-
tional complexity to the nodes. Diffusion is the process that innovation is communicated
between entities in a social network. Diffusion of innovation theory tries to show how an
innovation is adopted or rejected by members of a social network. The spread of a new idea
is explained in this theory by defining five phases knowledge, persuasion, decision, implemen-
tation, and confirmation which members of the social network who can have different defined
roles, should pass through. Members of network can belong to one of the five defined roles
innovators, early adapters, early majority, late majority, or laggards. Based on evidences
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in the network, a set of thresholds are defined and nodes compare their observations with
these thresholds. If they find strong variations they become early adopters of the idea that a
specific node is launching a wormhole attack. Otherwise, they just listen to their neighbours’
opinions (roles) and adopt a role based on the rule which the adopted role will be less than
neighbours’ role by a degree [5]. Superimposing this actor’s network on the network, authors
claimed they can detect and prevent wormhole attacks in wireless networks.
Is detective? Yes Is preventive? Yes
Used routing protocol AODV Is simulated? OPNET
Needs routing proto-
col modification
Yes Is mobility considered No
Disadvantages introduce end-to-end
delay to the network
Advantages distributed and does
not add computa-
tional complexity to
the nodes
Table 2.1: Diffusion of innovation summary
Path tracing algorithm: The path tracing algorithm is another wormhole detection mech-
anism dealing with networks which are using DSR, another on-demand routing protocol in
which the routed packets contain the address of each device the packet will traverse [46],
as their routing protocol. In this approach, neighbours communication has to be bidirec-
tional. T. Sakthil et al. [40] introduced a two-phase process which can detect and prevent
wormhole attacks. In the first phase, they calculate prior per hop distance, per hop distance,
and timstamp which are placed in the DSR packet header during the route discovery pro-
cess. In this approach, no tight clock synchronization is needed and each node uses its own
clock. On a route, the distance between adjacent nodes is computed and then compared
with consecutive neighbours distances on the same route, and if the difference exceeds a
threshold the link becomes suspicious that there is a wormhole. Another parameter which is
calculated is frequent appearance of a link in a path. Frequent appearance can be computed
by dividing the number of times a link appears in a path by the number of all created links.
Thus, if the difference of a link’s hop distance field and the prior hop distance field is more
than a threshold, and also the link’s frequent appearance is more than a threshold, the link
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is assumed to be a wormhole. In the second phase, if a wormhole has been detected, this
information would be propagated through the network and the malicious node information
will be added in wormhole lists in other nodes. Thus, a wormhole attack can be detected
using information resided in DSR packets’ header. In this paper, authors do not mention
how they calculated the thresholds.
Is detective? Yes Is preventive? Yes- it starts indetec-
tive mode
Used routing protocol DSR Is simulated? NS-2
Needs routing proto-
col modification
Yes Is mobility considered Yes - Random way
point
Disadvantages Does not mention
how to calculate the
thresholds
Table 2.2: Path tracing algorithm summary
WAP: Wormhole attack prevention algorithm [14], proposed a mechanism to detect the
wormhole in a mobile ad hoc networks without utilizing any special hardware. Sun Choi et
al. [14] suggest neighbour nodes monitoring method using a local timer called WPT (worm-
hole prevention timer). This method is deployed to networks with DSR routing algorithm
with disabled DSR optimization because it performs end-to-end signature authentication of
routing packet and verification of sending RREP right . When a node sends a RREQ to the
network, it starts a WPT and waits to overhear the rebroadcasted RREQ from its neigh-
bours. Using these over-hearings, the node builds up a neighbour node table which records
the sending and overhearing time of a specific RREQ from each neighbour. Assuming the
speed of light for packet propagation, by calculating the round trip distance between the
node and its neighbours, a node can use WPT to find out if one of its neighbours is located
on the other side of a wormhole. In order to detect exposed wormhole attacks, the wormhole
route detection mechanism is proposed, which calculates the delay per hop on each route,
and compares it to WPT, and it should be smaller. Using this method, WAP can detect
hidden exposed wormhole attacks. WAP places detected nodes related to a wormhole in a
list called wormhole node list, and broadcasts it in the network.
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Is detective? Yes Is preventive? No
Used routing protocol DSR Is simulated? Qualnet
Needs routing proto-
col modification
Yes Is mobility considered Yes - Random way
point
Table 2.3: Wormhole attack prevention
Multi path routing protocols: Ning Song et.al tried to detect and locate wormhole attack
in MANET with multi path routing protocols [43]. They suggested Statistical Analysis
approach (SAM) for multi path routing networks. Multi path routing protocols such as
SMR [29] detect multi paths to a destination and preserve them in a node. In case of route
failure, nodes do not need to execute the route recovery process and they just use next
available route. Multi-path routing protocols are claimed to have less management overhead
than single-path routing algorithms such AODV.
In this paper, the authors tried to use local data gathered by each node to spot the
wormhole attack. They calculated some statistics in normal environment, referred to as
training environment, and use these statistics in the real scenarios where the network is
under wormhole attack. They completely ignored mobility, and they discussed two types of
topologies: clustered, and uniform. At the end, they claimed that their method, which does
not need any extra hardware such as synchronized clock or GPS, can be used in intrusion
detection systems.
Is detective? Yes Is preventive? No
Used routing protocol MR - derivative of
SMR
Is simulated? Not mentioned
Needs routing proto-
col modification
It needs multi-path
routing protocol
Is mobility considered No
Disadvantages It depends on topol-
ogy of the network
and completely ignore
mobility
Advantages It brings vulnerability
of multi-path routing
algorithms into atten-
tion
Table 2.4: Multi path routing protocols
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2.6 Research Gap
Mobile ad hoc networks are infrastructureless networks with no central management entity
and frequently changing topology. These characteristics make them vulnerable to security
attacks. Wormhole attack is a complex network layer attack, which tries to gain the control
over the traffic flow in the network. In this chapter, several countermeasure against it have
been studied. It maybe feasible to have a framework which requires neither extra hardware
nor high computational power to detect and react upon the wormhole attack. Policies can be
used to empower the framework toward detecting not only wormhole attack but also other
type of abnormalities in the network.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Framework
We propose a framework which can be implemented in MANETs’ nodes in order to empower
them to detect anomalies and act upon them. Our framework utilizes policies [1] to establish
objective trust [44] among nodes. A node, equipped with the framework, is capable of
determining if it can trust its neighbours not to be involved in launching an specific attack
or selfish behaviour.
Throughout this Chapter we use a case study to illustrate the proposed framework.
The case study assumes a set of nodes scattered within 1500 by 1500 square meter area.
The nodes’ mobility pattern is random way point [9]. Nodes are not clustered in different
groups and there is neither a central administrative entity nor a connection to preexisting
fixed network. Prior to introducing the framework’s components we define several terms.
Anomalies: In this context, anomalies are deviations from normal behaviours which cause
network resources to be wasted. Anomalies can be caused either by a malicious node attack-
ing the network or by a node facing abnormal situations such as battery power shortage and
act selfishly. [35].
Environment: This refers to information about geographical deployment environment,
node’s hardware and software characteristics, utilized protocols, and transmission media.
Healthy environment: An operational environment of a MANET without any anomalies
such as an attack or resource shortage.
Unhealthy environment: An operational environment of a MANET with an active
anomaly such as an attack. e.g. a MANET with hidden wormhole attack.
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Resources in MANETs are scarce and valuable. Thus, efficient resource utilization
in this type of network is critical [20]. Making a decision regarding the existence of a
certain anomaly and properly defend against it in a completely distributed environment is
a challenging task that our framework makes nodes in a MANET capable of.
Nodes have full TCP/IP protocol [28] stack implemented in them and they operate in a
fully distributed environment with no central administrative entity. Nodes are on their own,
and they are not directed by any means. They are not aware of possible attacks and anomalies
[49]. Our framework first tries to educate nodes in MANET about these possible attacks
and then, empowers each node to detect attacks and act upon them. By implementing our
framework inside each node we are trying to make each node aware of possible attacks and
how to react in case of encountering with them. We educate each node about a possible
attack by means of files containing information about attacks and the proper ways to resist
them.
For example, in our case study, we educate each node about the existing potential
attack called wormhole attack [22].
3.1 How the framework works
A set of evidence is gathered by our framework. These evidences are defined by studying the
network’s environment, mission, and anomalies that the network is going to resist against.
By studying network’s environment and mission and throughly investigating the anomaly in
healthy and unhealthy environment, we define two sets of policies: investigation policies and
executive policies. Our framework uses these sets of policies with the gathered evidences to
detect anomalies and act upon them. Investigation policies and executive policies are defined
based on behaviours of the network in absence and presence of an abnormality. We inject
investigation and executive policies into each node. Each node gathers information about
the environment it is operating in, and uses investigation policies in order to make some as-
sumptions about a possible source and cause of the anomaly. Each node periodically receives
its neighbours’ opinions about the possible anomaly. Based on its own assumptions and its
neighbours’ opinions, the node forms its opinion which will be shared by the neighbours.
Based on the opinion, the node uses executive policies to react to the anomaly. Following
the policy-based management philosophy, our ultimate goal is to reach the point that by
only updating investigation and executive policies we can make the network more resistant
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to variety of security attacks.
Formation and utilization of the framework’s building blocks before and after deploy-
ment is depicted in figure 3.1.
Deployment Point
Time
Studying 
The Network Behaviour
Network Environment
Attacks / Abnormalities
Defining 
Investigation Policies
Executive Policies
Deciding
What Should Be monitor
(To design Monitoring Moule)
Injecting
Defined Policies into Nodes
Monitoring Module directions
Framework
Node
Investigation 
Policies
Executive Policies
Monitoring Module
Executive Module
Decision Making 
Modules
Figure 3.1: Framework before and after deployment
The framework allows nodes in a MANET to the point that they can form an opinion and take
an action autonomously [26]. Decision making process needs prior knowledge, experience,
and peer advice which is a very valuable asset in this process. In our framework, decision
making is done by each individual node autonomously. Here we present two analogies to
clarify the philosophy of our framework design.
Social Analogy: We can see a MANET as a society of autonomous entities [26]. In
a society, although people are interacting with each other, decision making can be seen
as an autonomic process in which each person based on his/her knowledge, experiences,
observations, and received advices makes his/her decisions. We are using this analogy to
design a framework to make each node capable of observing the environment and gathering
evidences to make decisions in an autonomous fashion.
Vaccination Analogy: A vaccine is a biological preparation that improves immunity to
a particular disease [48]. Policies in our framework work as vaccine agents that can stim-
ulate a node to recognize and act upon a potential abnormality. Policies are injected into
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nodes which are equipped with our framework and educate them about a particular disorder.
Therefore, by implementing our framework in each node we turn a node into a au-
tonomous decision maker which is educated about possible attacks and is capable of reacting
to them [26]. Figure 3.2 shows the decision making process carried out by each individual
node.
Time
Decision Making
Process
Monitoring /
Evidence Gathering
Opinion Gathering
Assumption Making
Opinion Making
Figure 3.2: Decision making process
In the next section, we describe how to define policies based on the environment and
possible abnormalities. In Section 3.3, we introduce the framework’s components to be
developed in each node.
3.2 Toward Defining Policies
MANETs are deployed in different environments utilizing a variety of routing protocols and
pursuing different goals and because of nodes’ mobility, their topologies are highly dynamic.
Despite of all these varieties and dynamisms, based on network mission and deployment
environment, prior to deploying a MANET, nodes’ behaviours and network traffic patterns,
in absence of malicious activities, to some extent are predictable. This predictability allows
for policies to be designed and injected into nodes.
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3.2.1 From Environment Characteristics to Policies
In this section, we introduce a method for defining sets of policies based on the network
environment. Environment is the combination of geographical deployment environment,
nodes’ hardware and software characteristics, utilized protocols, and transmission media. A
healthy environment is the environment in which the network in not under any attack and
nodes are not functioning in stress mode. We try to immunize a network by injecting sets
of policies into nodes in a network. Policies are defined by studying the environment, and
network behaviour in healthy and unhealthy environment.
The predicted behaviours in healthy environment can be used as a touchstone for all
active nodes to detect any deviation from the normal behaviours. In order to immunize the
network against anomalies, we need to know normal behaviour of the network in healthy
environment and network’s behaviour while anomaly is active. Comparing these two sets of
behaviours, we develop two sets of policies: Investigation policies and Executive policies.
Investigation policies are policies that are being used by each node to detect abnormal-
ities and executive policies are policies that are being used by each node to perform proper
reaction in response to detected anomalies. By defining investigation and executive policies
we strengthen the immunity of the network against certain abnormalities.
3.2.2 Defining Policies
In order to define policies, we should closely study the physical environment, network mis-
sion, mobility pattern, nodes’ hardware and software specifications, utilized protocols, and
the normal and abnormal behaviour of the network in absence and presence of the anomaly.
To do so, we introduce Network specification table in which all the different aspects of the
environment is recorded and it can be used as a starting point to define policies. Table 3.1
illustrates a sample Network specification table.
Based on the Network specification table, we predict some behaviours of the network
in a healthy state, which later will be used in defining investigation and excutive policies.
3.2.2.1 Studying the Network Behaviours
Based on the network characteristics and our goal in the specification table, we try to deter-
mine normal behaviours of the network in healthy and unhealthy states. Basically, we try to
35
Physical Environment Describes the physical/geographical environment that the
network is going to be deployed in
Network mission Describes the network mission
Mobility Pattern Based on the networks mission and type of nodes we can
predict mobility pattern
Nodes hardware specification Mention if nodes are equipped with a specific type of hard-
ware or software
Utilized protocol Describes the routing and other layers protocol
Our goals Describes our goals in defining policies
Table 3.1: Network Specification Table
document the behaviours of the network in absence and presence of the anomaly. Based on
this documented behaviours, we define our policies which will be injected to nodes. Figure
3.3 illustrates the policy defining process.
Studying Deploying EnvironmentStudying eploying Environ ent
Studying Network CharacteristicsStudying et ork Characteristics
Studying the anomaly which we are going to vaccinate 
the network against 
Studying the ano aly hich e are going to vaccinate 
the net ork against 
Geographical and 
Environmental 
Characteristics
eographical and 
Environ ental 
Characteristics
Mobility Patternobility Pattern Routing Protocolouting Protocol
Special Hardware used 
in  a node
Special ard are used 
in  a node
Network Missionet ork ission
Anomaly modes of 
operation
no aly odes of 
operation
Anomaly Goals
(Which aspect of the 
network is being 
affected)
no aly oals
( hich aspect of the 
net ork is being 
affected)
Predicted BehaviourPredicted ehaviour Investigation Policies Investigation Policies Executive PoliciesExecutive Policies
To Be injected in nodes
Figure 3.3: From Environment characteristics to policies
3.2.3 Defining policies for the case study
In the case study, first we define the Network specification table, then, we define several
policies to be injected inside each node.
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Physical Environment The network is going to be used in a battle field in humid
area in a forest
Network mission Gathering topological information to be used in future in-
fantry attacks
Mobility Pattern Random way point
Nodes hardware specification Nodes are not equipped with any GPS enabled devices.
Nodes use 802.11. Nodes are mounted on wearables.
Utilized protocol AODV [37]
Our goals Making the network immune against wormhole attack
Table 3.2: Network Specification Table For the Case Study Scenario
Based on the Network Specification Table of our case study we can define several attributes,
which can be used to represent a behavioural aspect. These attributes are defined for each
of its neighbours. These attributes are used in the design of the monitor module and the def-
inition of investigation and executive policies. Detailed information about wormhole attack
can be found in chapter 2.
The least attached neighbour: An imaginary area with a radius of a transmission range
of a node can be assumed around each node in a MANET. If the network is not very sparse,
a node’s neighbours can also be neighbours of each other. Based on the characteristics of
exposed wormhole attack [4], one head of wormhole tunnel, as illustrated in Figure 3.4,
should have the minimum number of common neighbours with the other neighbours. Thus,
a neighbour with the most uncommon neighbours -neighbours which are not found in other
received neighbour lists- can be malicious or affected by a malicious node.
The most traffic absorbent neighbour: The main intent of wormhole attack is to
absorb a high volume of data and forwarding these data from one point in the network to
another and then replaying them [22]. By listening to the traffic, we can find a node which
absorbs the highest volume of traffic from other nodes. This can be an indication of existence
of a wormhole tunnel in the network. Figure 3.5 illustrates a highly congested link created
by a wormhole tunnel.
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Figure 3.4: The Least Attached Neighbour
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Figure 3.5: The Most Traffic Absorbent Neighbour
The furthest neighbour: There are different techniques used to estimate the distance
between a node and its neighbours in a MANET [12]. In an exposed wormhole attack, usually
the wormhole tunnel becomes congested [4] which causes communication delay. This would
lead to the appearance of a node with a distance much larger than the mean of distances
with other neighbours. As shown in Figure 3.6, the existence of a node with an unusually
large distance can be the result of a wormhole attack.
The least mobile node: Due to the nature of wormhole attack, colluding nodes are
usually connected to each other. This connection can be seen as a barrier for their mobility.
Any deviation from the predicted mobility pattern and ratio of distance to signal strength
can be used as an indication of malicious activities.
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Figure 3.6: The Furthest Neighbour
Two very friendly nodes: When colluding nodes use encapsulation technique to form the
wormhole [4], the network traffic between them increases abnormally. The high traffic volume
between two nodes can be overheard and get detected by other nodes and be interpreted as
sign of malicious activity.
7
M1
13
M2
14
Figure 3.7: Two Very Friendly Nodes
According to the attributes, investigation policies can be defined as a set of neighbour
ranking policies to rank the neighbours of a node based on the perceived likelihood that the
node is malicious and may be launching a wormhole attack. For example, policies in the
form of
If attribute(neighbor)==true then being_malicious(neighbour)++;
can be defined.Therefore, an investigation policy can be
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If The_Least_Attached_Neighbor(B)==true then being_malicious(B)++;
and an executive policy based on the computed being_malicious_factor can be
If being_malicious_factor(B)>6 Then Ignore_Routing(B);
Ignore_Routing is a public method -which removes the routing information related to the
malicious node from the routing table- in one of the framework components called executive
which will be introduced in 3.3.3.
3.3 Framework components
In the previous section we introduced a method by which we can define sets of policies to be
injected in nodes in order to educate a node about an anomaly. In this section, we introduce
our framework which will be implemented in each node to make it capable of using the
defined policies in order to immunize the node against an anomaly. Thus, each node can be
immunized by leveraging the defined policies and the proposed framework.
By injecting the defined policies into nodes we vaccinate them against certain anoma-
lies. We assume that nodes are mobile entities that are always interacting with the envi-
ronment. Our proposed framework consists of three modules: Evidence Gatherer, Opinion
Manager, and Executive. Figure 3.8 illustrates the proposed framework.
The framework is implemented in each node. As mentioned before, each node continu-
ously interacts with the environment. Also, all the defined policies have been injected to it.
Figure 3.9 shows the framework’s components and the continuous interaction among a node
and the environment. For better understanding, we superimpose the policy defining process
to the diagram.
In the following sections, we describe the main modules of our framework and their
duties. Prior to describing the framework’s components, we define three terms: Assumption,
Opinion, and Introduced attacks which will be used to describe the framework’s components.
Assumption: As mentioned, the framework is implemented in each node. A node, based
on gathered evidences and investigation policies, forms some assumptions about possible
association between its neighbours and the introduced attacks. These assumptions are made
based on the node’s direct observations [44].
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Evidence GathererEvidence atherer
Opinion Managerpinion anager
Assumption Makerssu ption aker
Opinion/Assumption Tranceiverpinion/ ssu ption Tranceiver
Opinion Makerpinion aker
ExecutiveExecutive
Executive PoliciesExecutive Policies
Investigation PoliciesInvestigation Policies
Figure 3.8: Framework (To be implemented in each node)
Opinion: Opinions are assumptions with higher certainty. In order to form an opinion
about a relationship between one of neighbours and an introduced attack, a node not only
relies on its assumptions, but also it takes into consideration its neighbours’ opinions, which
are received in certain intervals. Therefore, an opinion implicitly reflects internal assump-
tions and external opinions.
Introduced attacks: Abnormalities and the ways of reacting against them which are
introduced to a node by means of investigation and executive policies are called Introduced
attacks.
3.3.1 Evidence Gatherer
Evidence gatherer gathers evidences. It puts a node in promiscuous mode [20] and contin-
uously listens to the network traffic and other important evidences such as signal strength,
neighbours’ hello messages, neighbours’ exchanged topology control lists, and communica-
tion pattern among other nodes. Evidences are facts which can facilitate the decision making
process for a node. For example, in a network which uses AODV [37] as its routing protocol,
evidence gatherer would run some analytical algorithms to detect most active neighbour,
most mobile neighbour etc.
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Figure 3.9: Framework interacting with environment
3.3.2 Opinion manager
The Opinion Manager is responsible for making decisions and direct the executive module
to act upon the detected anomaly. It consists of three submodules: Assumption maker,
Assumption/Opinion transceiver, and Opinion maker. Based on received evidences gathered
by Evidence gatherer, it tries to find the source and cause of an Introduced Attack. While
it is making assumptions about the source and cause of the anomaly, it also gathers its
neighbours’ opinions. By forming assumption and gathering other nodes’ opinions, a node
uses some statistical methods to make it’s own opinion about association between a neighbour
and an abnormality.
3.3.2.1 Assumption maker
Based on the evidences gathered by evidence gatherer, assumption maker is responsible for
making assumptions about the association between neighbours and introduced attacks. As-
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sumption maker ’s output is a list of nodes with maliciousness degrees regarding an introduced
attack which will be exposed to Opinion maker module.
3.3.2.2 Assumption/Opinion transceiver
Assumption/opinion transceiver in a node is responsible to receive neighbours’ opinions and
transmits the node’s opinion about an introduced attack to neighbours. This module exposes
internal assumptions and external opinions to opinion maker module to be used in opinion
making process.
3.3.2.3 Opinion maker
Opinion maker uses assumptions made by the assumption maker and opinions received by
Assumption/Opinion transceiver in order to make opinions. Opinions express the association
between a neighbour and introduced attack which is result of combining a node’s assumptions
and the node’s neighbour’s opinions.
3.3.3 Executive
Executive receives opinions from opinion maker and has access to executive policies. Based
on the opinions and executive policies, Executive performs some reactive actions to prevent
the malicious node from further disruption of the network performance. For example, if an
opinion tells executive that node X is malicious to launch a wormhole attack, executive can
ignore all routing messages to and from the malicious node.
3.4 The Framework in Action
In our framework, each node gathers evidences and other nodes’ opinions about a potential
attack. Based on the gathered evidences and a set of policies it makes an assumption about
a potential attack. Having assumptions and other nodes’ opinions, the node forms its own
opinions. The formed opinions then are shared with other nodes and be used along with
a set of policies to react to the potential attack. In this section, the overall behaviour of
the framework is described in an example. Figure 3.10 illustrates the topology of MANET
in which node M1 and M2 launch a half-open wormhole attack. Node M1 exposes itself to
routing but M2 does not participate in routing mechanism and only sends received packets
to the M1. Other nodes are benign nodes.
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Neighbour list: {14,13,12,M1}
14: {14,A,17,15,13,M1}     Uniqueness(14):{17,15}
13:{13,A,14,12} Uniqueness(13):{}
12:{12,A,9,11,13}  Uniqueness(12):{9}
M1:{M1,A,5,10,11,1}  Uniqueness(M1):{5,10,1}
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Investigation Policies
The Least Attached Neighbour                       1
The Furthest Neighbour                                   1
The Most Traffic Absorbent Neighbour        2
Figure 3.10: Example Topology
The process of opinion making for node A is described in the rest of this section. Upon
joining the network, node A starts to gather evidences and other nodes opinions regarding
a potential attack. Node A’s evidence gatherer executes its TheFurthestNeighbour, The-
LeastAttachedNeighbour and TheMostTrafficAbsorbent methods. Evidence gatherer listens
to network communications and results of the three methods are recorded as evidences.
Meanwhile, the internal assumption/external opinion module gathers other nodes’ opinions
embedded in received hello messages. Using TheLeastAttachedNeighbour method, nodes A
and 14 detect M1 as the least attached neighour. Other neighbours of A detect either A
or 14 as the least attached neighbour. This results show that the least attached neighbour
method in nodes that are not directly connected to the wormhole can detect neighbours
which are affected by a wormhole. TheFurthestNeighbour method in A estimates the dis-
tance between node A and its neighbours. A wormhole tunnel absorbs a large volume of
traffic which can cause congestion and consequently impose delay on communication links.
As it takes longer for node A to hear acknowledgment (response) hello message (see chapter
4) from M1, A detects M1 as the furthest neighbour. The same situation may happen for
Node 14. Other neighbours of A could detect different nodes as their furthest neighbour.
A operates in promiscuous mode and it can overhear its neighbour communications. The-
MostTrafiicAbosorbentNeighbour method keeps track of communications and at a time it
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can identify the node which communicates with a larger number of nodes. Malicious nodes
which launch wormhole attack present themselves as good candidates for forwarding pack-
ets to destinations. Thus, in exposed wormhole attack TheMostTrafficAbosorbentNeighbour
detects wormhole attack endpoints as the most traffic absorbent nodes. In case of hidden
wormhole attack nodes which are affected the most by wormhole attack are detected as
the most traffic absorbent neighbour. In the example, A and 14 detects M1 as the most
traffic absorbent while other A’s neighbours detect A and 14 as the most traffic absorbent
neighbour. Results of these three methods are evidences which are used by the Assumption
maker. The assumption maker uses investigation policies to quantify the gathered evidences
in a way that it can quantify a potential attack. In investigation policies evidences are related
to scalar values. For each neighbour, a variable called being malicious is maintained. In the
example, at a given time, assumption maker, based on gathered evidences and investigation
policies calculates values of being malicious of each neighbour for wormhole attack. These
values represent the current assumptions. In the example, A’s current assumption about
wormhole attack would be M2 by value of 4. and other A’s neighbour detects either A or 14
as the node with the highest being malicious value. A also, received other nodes opinions
about wormhole attack which in the example topology 14’s opinion of wormhole attack would
be node M1 and other A’s neighbours would detect A or 14 as wormhole attack endpoints.
A receives other nodes’ opinions. It forms an opinion based on its assumption and node 14s
opinion that node M1 is a wormhole endpoint. Opinions are weighted arithmetic mean of
assumptions and external opinions. Based on the opinion and investigation policies node A
starts to react and boycott the M1.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a policy-based immunization framework for mobile ad hoc
networks which can be implemented in each node to immunize it against certain abnor-
malities. The framework consists of several modules: evidence gatherer, assumption maker,
opinion maker, sssumption/Opinion transceiver, executive. These modules turn a node into
an autonomous entity that monitosr the network and looks for certain behaviours which are
introduced to the node by xml files. Based on the observed neighbours’ behaviours, the node
forms an assumption about the possibility of a neighbour being malicious. Then, the node
shares its opinion with its neighbours. Combining the observed behaviours with gathered
opinions, the node is capable of making opinion with higher certainty.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Simulation
This chapter describes the implemented prototype of our proposed framework, and demon-
strates the implementation of the proposed framework in the AODV -powerd MANET in
order to prevent wormhole attack.
4.1 OPNET
There are several ways in order to validate a new framework or protocol in a networked
environment such as: mathematical modeling, simulation, hybrid (which is combination of
simulation and mathematical modeling), and test-bed emulation [33]. Mathmatical modeling
is the fastest method, but when a complicated model with various factors is to be modeled, it
is not accurate and it becomes inapplicable. Simulation models the interaction between mod-
eling devices, and usually creates detailed packet-by-packet model for network activities. In
order to compromise the significant amount of computational power and the time-consuming
nature of simulation, sometimes mathematical modeling combined with simulation are used
to model behavious of a network. This method is called hybrid modeling. Test-bed emulation
is implementing a new framework or protocol in small scale on real devices. This method is
more expensive and almost always involves unexpected engineering problems.
OPNET (OPtimized Network Engineering Tools) is the leading commercial discrete
event simulator [33], which is highly used in industry and academia. OPNET follows object-
oriented principals. A hierarchy of models are used in a network model in order to simulate
network behaviour. In OPNET, network model contains node models, and node models
consists of processes, transmitters and receivers. A process model simulates bahaviours of a
node using a state transition diagram, in which transitions are conditions/events that occur
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in a network’s life span. The OPNET library contains many predefined network devices and
protocols such as: routers, switches, fixed and mobile wireless workstations, etc. OPNET
combines C language with state transition diagram, and offers a new language called Porto-
C which is being used for designing and implementing process models. Also, C++ can
be used to extend OPNET preexisting models. OPNET offers debugging facilities through
OPNET debugger (ODB), in which you can follow packets flow and movements of a mobile
node in a simulated environment. In this chapter, OPNET is used for the simulation of the
proposed framework. All the examples and sample codes are from a project which addresses
the mentioned case study in Chapter 3.
4.2 Implementation considerations (prerequisites)
In OPNET, MANETs can be modeled using the manet station adv node model. Several
predefined mobility patterns are offered by OPNET, and custom trajectory patterns can be
implemented. In manet staiton adv the full ip stack is implemented. In the ip layer, the
ip process has a child process called manet mgr that itself contains different process models
which implement the functionalities of AODV, OLSR, TORA, etc. The proposed framework
is going to extend the aodv rte (AODV routing model). In order to utilize the proposed
framework in the case study, wormhole attack should be simulated in OPNET. There is no
predefined model that implements wormhole attack. In order to launch the wormhole attack,
manet staiton adv process model has been extended to manet staiton adv with wormhole by
adding one process, WormholeTunnel, and one set of point-to-point receiver and transmitter.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the manet staiton adv with wormhole node model.
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Figure 4.1: Manet Station Advanced With Wormhole node model
In order to turn each MANET node to an active traffic monitoring module, which
is needed by the evidence gatherer of the proposed framework, each node should be capa-
ble of performing in promiscuous mode [49]. To do so, manet staiton adv is extended to
manet staiton adv promiscuous which enables a node to operate in promiscuous mode.
4.3 Implementation of framework components
For the sake of the implementation and moving toward the policy-based immunization frame-
work, we placed the framework’s components in a layered architecture. Figure 4.2 shows the
framework’s components from an implementation perspective.
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Figure 4.2: Framework From Implementation Perspective
In our framework, each node is a PDP and a PEP. Framework components are defined
as classes in aodv rte process model. In each node, in the Begin sim interrupt, objects of
these classes are declared and their operations are started.
4.3.1 Evidence gatherer class
Evidence gatherer consists of public methods which can be called by the objects. There
is an entry in evidence.xml for each method, which stores the results of execution of the
method. When the object of this class is initiated, communications on the network are
monitored, and methods are executed in intervals. Evidence gatherer records the neighbours
list of all the neighbours and information about communications among neighbors. Methods
are designed based on the values of attributes that a node assigns to its neighbours, such
as attributes discussed in 3.2.3. For example, TheMostTrafficAbsorbent method, in each
interval, finds the most traffic absorbent neighbor and saves the result into evidences.xml.
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In the mentioned case study, we implemented three methods in evidence gatherer : The least
attached neighbour, The furthest neighbour, and The most traffic absorbent neighbour.
The least attached neighbour: In AODV, a hello message is a route reply broadcasted
with a TTL of one. A hello message is received by all one hop neighbours. To support a node
being capable of finding the least attached neighbour, we add two fields to AODVs hello mes-
sage structure: neighbour list and neighbours’ neighbour list. When a node sends a hello mes-
sage, it includes all its neighbours and its neighbours’ neighbors to the body of the message.
Thus nodes by exchanging hello message can have a view of the network topology within two
hops. A node, for each neighbour A forms a set called AllNeighbours(A). This set contains
all neighbours of A. The set-theoretic difference of the union of all the AllNeighbours of
other neighbours with respect to AllNeighbours(A) forms a set called UniqueNeighbours(A).
UniqueNeighbours(A) contains nodes which are only neighbours with A. The cardinality of
UniqueNeighbours(A) is calculated as Uniqueness(A). The neighbour that has the Unique-
ness set with largest cardinality is selected as the least attached neighbour. If two or more
neighbours have the same Uniqueness value, the one with larger number of neighbours is
selected as the least attached neighbour. For example, for a node C its neighbour list and
neighbours’ neighbour list are as follows:
Neighbour List : {A, B, F, Z}
Neighbours’ Neighbour list :
A : {A, B, C, D, H}
B : {A, B, C, D, F, H }
F : {B, C, F, H, W, Z}
Z : {C, H, Z}
The UniqueNeighbours(A), UniqueNeighbours(B), and UniqueNeighbours(Z) are empty
sets but UniqueNeighbours(F) is {W}. Thus, F is the least attached neighbour.
The furthest neighbour: In AODV, local connectivity between neighbours is handled
by hello messages. The current sequence number and IP address is included in each hello
message. In our framework, in order to enable a node capable of calculating the distance
between itself and its neighbour, we added two fields to the hello message structure: stamp1
and stamp2. When a node A wants to send a hello message it generates a unique code that
can identify the message and inserts the code into stamp1, and sets stamp2 to null. When a
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node B receives the hello message it checks the stamps. If stamp1 is not null and stamp2 is
null, B has to reply to the received hello message. It generates a new hello message, copies
the value of stamp1 in the received message into stamp2 of the new message and broadcasts
the message to its one-hop neighbours. In this example the hello message generated by
node B functions as an acknowledgement to the hello message generated by A. When A
receives the hello message generated by B, it determines that the received hello message is
an acknowledgement to one of its hello messages sent earlier. Using the stamps, recorded
sending and receiving times, and the speed of light, A can estimate distances between itself
and its neighbours [22]. The neighbour with the largest distance is selected as the furthest
neighbour.
The most traffic absorbent neighbour: In our framework, nodes not only keep track
of active routes, but also utilize the overheard communication between neighbours to gain
a better insight of the network. For each neighbour, the number of nodes communicating
with that neighbour is maintained. Nodes operate in promiscuous mode and thus a node can
overhear all the communication happening in their vicinity - an area in which a node can
receive signals. Each node maintains a list which records node pairs which are communicating
with each other. Each entry in the routing table contains a destination address and a next
hop address through which the destination can be accessed. A neighbour with the largest
number of communicating nodes is selected as the most traffic absorbent neighbour. If two
neighbours have the same number of communicating nodes, the one that appears the most
in the next hop fields of the routing table is selected as the most traffic absorbent neighbour.
4.3.2 Assumption maker class
Assumption maker uses instructions in the attacks.xml, investigation policies in Investi-
gationPolicies.xml, and evidences gathered in Evidence.xml to form an assumption about
the relation between a specific attack, which is introduced to system by attacks.xml, and a
neighbour.
4.3.3 Opinion/Assumption transceiver class
4.3.4 Opinion maker class
Based on the instructions in Attacks.xml and the assumption made by assumption maker
and received opinions from Opinion/Assumption transceiver, which are stored in InternalAs-
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sumptionsExternalOpinions.xml, an opinion maker class makes an opinion about a possible
relation between a neighbor and an introduced attack, and stores the opinion into Opin-
ions.xml.
4.3.5 Executive
Executive utilizes executivePolicies.xml and opinions stored in opinions.xml to instruct the
node to respond to potential attacks. Executive consists of methods which can perform
actions such as removing a route from routing table and ignoring the incoming packet from
a neighbor. In the case study, each attribute is quantified and related to neighbors, and in this
way the final opinion regarding the possible relation between a neighbour and abnormality,
based on the defined policies, is formed.
Collaboration among the framework’s components is facilitated by a set of XML files
as introduced by the name of anomaly introductory files. The XML files are injected to
each node prior to launch This makes nodes ready to deal with abnormalities. Attacks
are introduced to nodes using an XML file called attacks.xml. Each attack in attacks.mxl
has its own signature, which is used in other XML files to refer to this specific attack.
Investigation and Executive policies are placed in each node by investigationPolicies.xml
and executionPolicies.xml. Nodes’ assumptions and their neighbours’ opinions are stored in
internalAssumptionExternalOpinions.xml. Finally, nodes’ opinions reside in opinions.xml.
4.3.6 Attacks.XML
The attacks.xml file stores the attacks that a node should be aware of and act upon. at-
tacks.xml is the place that different attacks are introduced. Each attack has a signature
which will be used by the framework’s components to refer to this attack. Assumption and
Opinion makers use this file to manage the policy checking, assumption and opinion making
processes. Each attack has a tag. Attributes of a tag include:
signature: This defines the signature of an attack which will be used as a reference tag in
other XML files. XML files and the framework’s components refer to this attack using this
signature.
investigationPolicyCheckingInterval: This defines the time interval in which assump-
tion maker should check investigationPolicies against current evidences and make its as-
sumption regarding a potential relation among the attack and neighbours.
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executionPolicyChceckingInterval: This defines the time interval in which Executive
checks the ExectionPolicies for the attack.
opinionMakingInterval: This defines the time interval in which opinion maker should
check internalAssumptionsExternalOpinions.xml, make an opinion about the potential attack
and store it in opinions.xml.
attacks.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Attacks>
<Wormhole
signature="WA"
investigationPolicyCheckingInterval="30S"
executivePolicyChceckingInterval="30S"
opinionMakingInterval="30S"
opinionTarget="Neighbour"
opinionValue="Scalar"
opinionDissiminatingInterval="30S"
opinionDissiminationScope="AllNeghibours"
internalAssumptionWeight="2"
externalOpinionWeight="1"/>
</Attacks>
Figure 4.3: attacks.xml
opinionTarget: This defines the opinions’ target. In the case study, for wormhole attack
assumptions and opinions are made for neighbours. The opinion’s values are going to be
assigned to neighbours.
opinionValue: This defines the node’s opinion value type about the OpinionTarget. For
example, the node’s opinion about the wormhole attack is neighbour A by value of 5.
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opinionDissiminatingInterval: This defines the time interval in which OpinionTran-
ceiver sends out current opinions.
opinionDissiminatioScope: This defines how far an opinion can be disseminated. e.g
one-hop neighbours, two-hop neighbours, or broadcast.
internalAssumptionWeight/ externalOpinionWeight: Opinions are made based on
internal Assumptions and external Opinions. In making opinion process, internal Assump-
tions and external Opinions can have an unequal weight. In an attack, it is possible that
one has the higher impact on the final opinion than the other.
4.3.7 Evidences.XML
Evidences are the network monitoring results that are exposed by Evidence gatherer. Entries
in this file are public methods in Evidence Gatherer, which can be called from other modules.
This file automatically updated by Evidence Gatherer, and contains captured evidences re-
sults.
sourceAssembly: This is the Evidence Gatherer module. In this modules, all the methods
which are responsible for monitoring the network and gathering the evidences are defined.
These methods are executed periodically based on different policies and gather evidences
which are going to be stored in evidences.xml. Each evidence has its own attributes. For
example, in the above evidences.xml, there is an evidence entry which has the following
attributes.
method: This is the name of the public methods insourceAssembly, which is used to cal-
culate the value of this evidence.
returnType: This can be a scalar value or a node or a list of nodes.
description: This is a short description of this evidence.
Evidence tags have two sub-tags, Value and Last RecordedTime, which contain the last
returned value, and execution date and time of the method.
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4.3.8 InvestigationPolicies.XML
Assumption maker uses Investigation policies in order to make assumptions. As mentioned
in section 3.2.2, Investigation policies are defined by close examination of the network’s
environment, behaviours, and mission. Assumption maker checks the gathered evidences,
which are resided in evidences.xml, against Investigation policies to form an opinion about
the potential attacks introduces in attacks.xml.
The main entries in this XML files are policies. Policies are grouped by tags with an
attack signature from attacks.xml
Each policy set is associated with one attack. Policies try to facilitate the assumption
making process by quantifying the observed evidences into the measurable entities.
checkingScope: This defines which entities in the system should be compliant with this
set of policy. e.g AllNeighbours or AllActiveNeighbours.
indicatorVector: This is the variable or collection name which is used by Assumption
maker to store the values representing the quantified evidences for the attack.
resultType: This defines the return value type of checking process of this policy set for
entities in the checkingDomain.
assumptionFunction: In order to form an assumption to be stored in internalAssump-
tionExternalOpinion.xml, an aggregate function is needed to be applied to values calculated
in assumption making process.
Policy sets are enclosed in Policy tags. Every policy consists of a condition and action.
Condition is checked against all the entities in checkingScope, and in case of true outcome,
the action would occur.
4.3.9 InternalAssumptionsExternalOpinions.XML
Assumptions, which are made by Assumption Maker and neighbours’ opinions regarding a
specific attack, are stored in this file. This file is used by Opinion maker to make current
opinion about the attack based on internalAssumptionWeight and externalOpinionWeight
in attacks.xml.
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Internal assumptions and external opinions are being enclosed in attack-signature tags.
type: This determines a tag is an internal assumption or an external opinion.
time: This is the recorded time of this assumption or opinion.
Every opinion or assumption encloses the Node and Value which are presenting the
quantified value of an assumption or idea at the time.
4.3.10 Opinions.XML
Opinion maker, based on the definition of an attack in attacks.xml and the assumption and
opinions stored in internalAssuptionsExternalOpinions.xml, makes an opinion. The opinion
is stored in opinion.xml.
Each opinion encloses Node, Value, and contriutors tags which represent the opinion
about an attack at time and number of neighbours which contributed in forming this opinion.
4.3.11 ExecutivePolicies.XML
Executive policies are used by Executive in order to direct the node to act based on the
current opinions.
Executive checks executionPolicies.xml against current opinions in each executivesPol-
icyChceckingInterval, which is defined in attacks.xml. Based on them, it executes one of its
public methods, which consequently directs the behaviour of the node.
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Evidences.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Evidences sourceAssembly="evidenceGatherer.cpp">
<TheLeastAttachedNeighbours method="TheLeastAttachedNeighbour"
returnType="Node" description="This method
returns a neighbour with the least number of
common neighbours in comparison with
other neighbours">
<TheLeastAttachedNEighbour>
<Value>
Neighbour1 (192.168.0.1)
</Value>
<LastRecordedTime>
20130530 11:48AM
</LastRecordedTime>
</TheLeastAttachedNEighbour>
</TheLeastAttachedNeighbours>
<Evidence>
</Evidence>
</Evidences>
Figure 4.4: evidences.xml
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InvestigationPolicies.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<InvestigationPolicies>
<WA checkingDomain="AllNeighbours" indicatorVector="WA_BeingMaliciou"
resultType="Scalar" assumptionFunction="MAX">
<Policy>
<Condition>TheLeastAttachedNeighbour</Condition>
<Action> 2 </Action>
</Policy>
</WA>
</InvestigationPolicies>
Figure 4.5: investigationPolicies.xml
InternalAssumptionsExternalOpinions.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<InternalAssumptionsExternalOpinions>
<WA type="Internal" time="20130528 11:10AM">
<Node>Neighbour 3</Node>
<Value>4</Value>
</WA>
<WA type="External" time="20130528 12:10AM">
<Node>Neighbour 2</Node>
<Value>7</Value>
</WA>
</InternalAssumptionsExternalOpinions>
Figure 4.6: internalAssumptionsExternalOpinions.xml
58
Opinions.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<WA time="20130528 10:00AM">
<node>Neighbour 3</node>
<value>3</value>
<contributors>3</contributors>
</WA>
Figure 4.7: Opinions.xml
ExecutionPolicies.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<ExecutionPolicies executerAssembely="Executive.cpp">
<WA>
<Policy>
<Condition> opinions->value GT 6</Condition>
<Action> IgnoreRouting(opinions->node) </Action>
</Policy>
</WA>
</ExecutionPolicies>
Figure 4.8: ExecutivePolicies.xml
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results
This Chapter presents an evaluation of the proposed framework using the case study de-
scribed in Chapter 3. Section 5.1 describes simulations environment setup and different
scenarios we used in our simulations. In Section 5.2, benchmarks for the evaluation of the
proposed framework are introduced. Section 5.3 explains how we set up the framework in a
way it can detect wormhole attack. Finally, Section 5.4 discusses the impact of using policies
in detecting abnormality in a MANET.
5.1 Simulation Environment Setup
This work uses OPNET for simulations. The mobile ad hoc networks used have the charac-
teristics presented in Table 5.1. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the initial topology of the network
without any malicious nodes. In our environment we use AODV as it is one of the dominant
routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks. To enforce mobility, we used the random way
point mobility pattern. The simulation runs for 600 seconds. We used Out-of-Band Channel
technique to launch a wormhole attack. Colluding nodes are connected by a fixed duplex
link. All wireless communications transceived between colluding nodes use this wired link.
The launched wormhole attack is a half-closed wormhole attack. This means that only one
of the end points of the wormhole tunnel is exposed to the routing process.
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Figure 5.1: Manet Simulation setup 40 nodes in 1000*1000 m
Routing protocol AODV
Percent of node moving 100%
AODV Hello message interval 1 sec.
Simulation time 600 sec
Mobility patern Random way point
Seed value Yes
Number of nodes 40 and 60
Node lacement of simulation area Random
Packet Inter-arrival time Exponential(1)
packet size Exponential(1024)
Table 5.1: Simulation setup
5.2 Benchmarks
We compare the proposed framework with two benchmarks that represent two scenarios:
healthy environment and unhealthy environment. The healthy environment has no malicious
nodes while the unhealthy environment has malicious nodes that initiate a wormhole attack.
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5.2.1 Healthy environment
We collected the average hop count per route and MANET delay in healthy state of the
MANET. The MANET delay of a node is the average amount of time it takes to process a
packet. Figure 5.2 and 5.3 compare these two metrics in the 40-node and 60-node scenarios.
As expected, the average hop count is larger in 60-node scenario. Consequently, the MANET
delay is higher in 60-node scenario. A successful wormhole attack should show a smaller
average hop count than topology that does not have wormhole attack. The reason is that
wormhole attacks are designed to convince benign nodes that the hop count is shorter than
it really is. The MANET delay is longer since wormhole endpoints have to process more
packets than a benign node, and it imposes queuing time to each packet being processed.
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Figure 5.2: Average hop count per route in healthy environment
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Figure 5.3: Average MANET delay in healthy environment
5.2.2 Unhealthy environment
The launched wormhole attack is a half-closed wormhole attack. Scenarios with 40 and 60
nodes without wormhole attack and with one and two wormhole attacks are simulated and
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the results show that we have successfully launched the wormhole attack. Figures 5.4 and 5.5
demonstrate the average hop count per route in 40-node and 60-node scenarios respectively.
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Figure 5.5: Average hop count per route 60 node scenario
As depicted in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, by launching wormhole attack, the average hop
count per route is reduced.
We have also measured node’s MANET delay. Simulation results are illustrated in
Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The simulation results show the higher packet processing time imposed
by the increased delay incurred by malicious nodes
63
00.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
M
A
N
ET
 D
e
la
y
Time 600sec
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_40Nodes_BenignN
ode_MANETDelay 
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_40Nodes_WithOn
eWormhole_MaliciousNode_MANETDelay 
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_40Nodes_WithTw
oWormhole_MaliciousNode_MANETDelay
Figure 5.6: MANET delay of Malicious and benign nodes in 40 node scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
M
A
N
ET
 D
e
la
y
Time 600sec
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_40Nodes_WithTw
oWormhole-MaliciousNode_MANETDelay
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_60Nodes_BenignN
ode_MANETDelay
MANET_AODV_1000X1000_60Nodes_WithOn
eWormhole_MaliciousNode_MANETDelay
Figure 5.7: MANET delay of Malicious and benign nodes in 60 node scenario
5.3 Framework settings
The effectiveness of the framework relies on the values assigned to assumption making in-
terval, opinion making interval and opinion dissemination interval (see Chapter 3 for more
information). These are operational factors and they specify how often the framework should
execute to detect specific attacks. These values are specified as a function of the interval
between Hello messages (see chapter 2 for more information). Table 5.2 presents the values
assigned to each of these factors during the experiments. There is a weight associated with
an internal assumption and one associated with an external opinion. These are also specified
in Table 5.2.
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Simulation Runs 27
Intenal Assumption
Weight
1
External Opinion
Weight
0.75, 0.50, 0.25
Assumption Making
Interval
1, 3, 5 * Hello
message Inter-
val
Opinion Making
Interval
10, 15, 30 *
Hello message
Interval
Opinion
Desimination
Interval
10, 15, 30 *
Hello message
Interval
Table 5.2: Factors impacting performance
In order to quantify a neighbour’s behaviour, each node assigns values to attributes
that characterize the a specific aspect of behaviour. There are three attributes associated
with a half-open wormhole attack: The least attached neighbour, the most traffic absorbent
neighbour, and the furthest neighbour. Table 5.3 shows the value assigned to each of these
attributes of a node’s neighbour when it observes one of these behaviours. These values are
used in the calculation of malicious behaviour (see chapter 3). In the experiment we used
three combinations as presented in Table 5.3.
Combination 1 Combination 2 Combination 3
The least attached
neighbour
1 1 1
The Most Traffic Ab-
sorbent Neighbour
1 2 3
The Furthest Neigh-
bour
1 1 1
Table 5.3: Quantifying setting combinations used in experiments
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We defined four simulation scenarios: forty node with one wormhole, forty node with
two wormhole, sixty nodes with one wormhole, sixty nodes with two wormhole. For each of
these scenarios, we used all the operational settings presented in Table 5.2 and for each run
we used all three combinations mentioned in Table 5.3. This means all the combinations of
the values in Table 5.2 and 5.3 are used in all the scenarios.
5.3.1 Experimental results
This section presents the result of our experiments in evaluating different assignments of
values to operational and quantifying settings.
We used OPNET debugger - ODB facilities in order to monitor the behaviour of nodes
in the network. Using ODB, the neighbours lists and the routing tables are logged. Also, we
have monitored our framework xml files to gain insight about the overall functionality of the
network. For example, opinions.xml plays the role of a log file in investigating if a malicious
node is detected by a benign node or not.
Table 5.4 presents the results of our experiments. The first row shows the average
number of nodes interacting with colluding nodes during the simulation. The second row
shows the average success rate of detecting the existence of wormhole attack by benign
nodes, and the third row shows the highest success rate of the wormhole attack detection in
all simulation runs.
Average number of node interacting with colluding nodes is calculated using OPNET
debugger facilities. Nodes’ opinions are studied and it was checked if during the simulation
they identified malicious nodes. In each scenario, the average number of times nodes detect
malicious nodes are calculated. This average is calculated for all the nodes which interacted
with the malicious nodes during the simulation. For each scenario, simulations was run with
all the combinations of values in tables 5.2 and 5.3 with no repetition.
Table 5.5 represents the configuration that provided the best average success rate of
detecting the existence of a wormhole.
5.4 Impact of using the proposed framework
We use the configuration settings that gave us the best average success rate (see Table 5.5) to
investigate the effectiveness of investigation and executive policies. The xml specification of
the policies are in Appendix A. The policies used in the experiments are informally described
bellow.
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40-Nodes one
wormhole
40-Nodes Two
wormhole
60-Nodes one
wormhole
60-Nodes Two
wormhole
Average Number of
Node Interacting
with Colluding
Nodes
62% 80% 50% 78%
Average Success
Rate of Detecting
the Existance of
wormhole
83% 82% 76% 80%
The Best Succes
Rate of Detecting
the Existance of
wormhole
87% 88% 81% 83%
Table 5.4: Experiment results
Operational settings
Internal assumption
weight
1 External
opinion weight
0.5
Assumption making
interval
5 * Hello
Message
Interval
Opinion
making
interval
15 * Hello
message inter-
val
Quantifying settings
The least attached
neighbour
1 The Most
Traffic
Absorbent
Neighbour
2
The Furthest Neigh-
bour
1
Table 5.5: Settings concluded from experiments to be used in wormhole attack resistant network
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Name: Add to suspicious list
Condition: If value of an opinion about a node is equal or greater than 2.
Action: Add the node to the suspicious list.
Name: Suspend route
Condition: If the value of an opinion about a node is equal or larger than 3 and node is
already in suspicious list.
Action: Suspend the routes in which the next hop is this node for 5 * CONTRIBUTORS
* opinionMakingInterval and send RERR.
Name: New neighbour alert
Condition: If a new neighbour is added to the neighbours list.
Action: Send out a hello message immediately.
Name: Alter Being malious value
Condition: If a node is the least attached neighbour.
Action: Add 1 to the being malicious factor of the node.
An XML parser is designed in which all XML files can be interpreted and associated
to methods and data structures in the system. This light-weight customized XML parser
is designed because using policy languages such as Ponder [3] in MANET imposes high
computational overhead to nodes.
Having policies injected in nodes, which are provided by the framework, we have run
the 40-node and 60-node simulations. We measured the average hop count and MANET
delay. Figures 5.8, 5.9 demonstrate the comparison between MANETs in which nodes are
not equipped by the framework with MANETs equipped by the framework. The results
show that policies which are tailored to detect wormhole attack are successful in returning
the network to the healthy state. Also, successfully returning a MANET to the healthy state
provides good evidence of the collaborative opinion making scheme of the framework.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future works
This thesis relates to the area of mobile ad hoc network security, and its focus is on design and
implementation of a policy-based immunization framework for securing MANETs. Section
6.1 presents the conclusion. Section 6.2 presents the contribution of this thesis, and 6.3
describes possible future work.
6.1 Conclusion
Our proposed policy-based immunization framework in used to turn each mobile node in a
MANET to autonomous decision maker, which can reflect on possible abnormalities. Policies
are used to guide decision making by nodes in a MANET. Policies can be designed to address
a specific type of attack such as wormhole attack.
The proposed framework in flexible and extensible. Decision making regarding a spe-
cific attack and determining the proper reaction against it is guided by using policies defined
in each node. Currently, we use a set of policies to detect wormhole attack but the frame-
work is flexible enough that it is possible to introduce new type of policies that address other
types of attacks. The framework also utilizes a collaborative voting scheme which mitigate
the effect of the fact that a node can be physically captured by an attacker.
The proposed framework is modular. Communication among modules are facilitated
by means of xml files. This kind of behaviour makes module loosely coupled, and another
enhanced module(s) can be easily added to the framework.
We can successfully detect the existence of wormhole attack in a MANET without
adding any extra hardware to nodes. Standard protocols are not modified, and only few
fields are added to the local connectivity management packet called hello messages. There
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is no need for any centralized entity to ensure the authenticity of communicated messages,
and nodes became educated in a way that they can make more informed decisions.
We validated the functionality of our framework by implementing a case study and
carrying out experminets for several scenarios using OPNET.
6.2 Contribution
By using our framework nodes become autonomous decision makers who can detect and act
upon an abnormality more reflectively than reactively. Our framework is a trust manage-
ment system which utilizes policies to help a MANET delivering secure and reliable services.
We have used policies in order to direct components of a trust management system, evidence
manager, opinion manager, and decision maker in more granular way than the current trust
management systems. The proposed framework establishes trust regarding a specific ab-
normality between nodes. This approach helps a MANET to be more focused on potential
abnormalities in different circumstances.
6.3 Future work
There is a good deal of room for enhancing either the current modules or adding new ones to
the proposed framework. For example, a validator module can be added in order to validate
final opinions.
The algorithms for quantifying the proposed attributes, which are the sign of potential
abnormalities can be enhanced and become more complex to support more conditions.
We can define a trust level for each neighbour of a node. In that case, received opinions
from neighbours regarding a specific attack can influence a node opinion differently. For
example, a one-hop neighbour, whose opinion about an attack was close to a node opinion
for the last three opinion-gathering-cycle, can be given a higher trust level than other one-hop
neighbours with variant opinions.
A policy delivery mechanism can be defined in a way that in case of the development
of new sets of policies they can be deployed to a MANET, which is operating on a field.
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Appendix A
Policies
A node’s assumption maker uses investigation policies in order to quantify its neighbours’
behaviours. Investigation policies are grouped and tagged by an attack signature from at-
tacks.xml. Policy set A.1 demonstrates the investigation policies created from the framework
setting values in order to detect and react against wormhole attack.
Executive uses executive policies to act upon a detected attack. ExecutivePolicies.xml
exposes public methods of executive class. Executive retrieves the latest opinion about
a potential attack from opinions.XML. Based on the retrieved values, which can be the
indication maliciousness of a neighbour, it executes a method from executive class. Policy
set ?? illustrates the ExecutivePolicies.XML created from the framework setting values in
order to detect and react against wormhole attack.
Policies in investigationPolicies.xml and executive.xml are defined using a hierarchy of
tags. The main policy tag is policy which encloses condition and action tags. Condtion tag
consists of two operand and one operator tags. Action tag encloses method and parameter
tags which are a method and its parameter that are executed when the condition is true.
Some of the policies defined in investigationPolicies.xml and executive.xml are as follows.
InvestigationPolicies.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<InvestigationPolicies>
<WA checkingDomain="AllNeighbours" indicatorVector="WA_MaliciousFactor"
resultType="Scalar" assumptionFunction="MAX">
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<Policy>
<Condition>
<operands>
<operand>
<method>
TheLeastAttachedNeighbour
</method>
</operand>
<operand>
TRUE
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
EQ
</operator>
</Condition>
<Action>
<method>
Add
</method>
<parameters>
<parameter>
1
</parameter>
</parameters>
</Action>
<Condition>
<operands>
<operand>
<method>
TheMostTrafficAbsorbentNeighbour
</method>
</operand>
<operand>
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TRUE
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
EQ
</operator>
</Condition>
<Action>
<method>
Add
</method>
<parameters>
<parameter>
2
</parameter>
</parameters>
</Action>
<Condition>
<operands>
<operand>
<method>
TheFurthestNeighbour
</method>
</operand>
<operand>
TRUE
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
EQ
</operator>
</Condition>
<Action>
<method>
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Add
</method>
<parameters>
<parameter>
1
</parameter>
</parameters>
</Action>
</Policy>
</WA>
</InvestigationPolicies>
Policy Set A.1: investigationPolicies.xml
ExecutionPolicies.XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<ExecutionPolicies executiveClass="Executive">
<WA>
<Policy>
<Conditions>
<condition>
<operands>
<operand>
opinionValue
</operand>
<operand>
4
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
EQ
</operator>
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</condition>
<condition>
<operands>
<operand>
opinionValue
</operand>
<operand>
2
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
EQGT
</operator>
</condition>
<operator>
AND
</operator>
</Conditions>
<Action>
<method>
SuspendRouting
</method>
<parameters>
<parameter>
opinions->node
</parameter>
5
</parameters>
</Action>
</Policy>
<Policy>
<Condition>
<operands>
<operand>
76
opinionValue
</operand>
<operand>
2
</operand>
</operands>
<operator>
LEQ
</operator>
</Condition>
<Action>
<method>
AddToMalicious
</method>
<parameters>
<parameter>
opinions->node
</parameter>
</parameters>
</Action>
</Policy>
</WA>
</ExecutionPolicies>
Policy Set A.2: ExecutivePolicies.xml
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